

THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Philosophies Underlying European Nationalist Groups

Feliks Gross, *Issue Editor*

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EDITORIAL

Last spring, when the editors discussed this number of THE JOURNAL with Dr. Gross, we felt that one aspect of reconstruction of Europe was likely to be overlooked; namely, the underlying philosophies of the people themselves. Different cultures produce different ways of life and different values. These values are usually more important to the group than is life itself. Consequently, if behavior were to be understood, it would be necessary to understand this cultural background.

We agreed that Prussianism, Hitlerism, and the authoritarian pattern of life in Germany could not be understood without understanding German respect for discipline, and the philosophical point of view of numerous German philosophers. Likewise, when the British were sending their children to America during the blitz, they sent along a little handbook which carried the gems of English literature and philosophy. These were the things men were dying for.

Obviously, programs of reconstruction must take this into account, for not only does this cultural mass represent values but it is the basic ingredient of personality. Well-meaning persons, particularly Americans, are likely to feel that the resources we share with these nations through lend-lease and relief should be used as instruments of indoctrination toward our way of life. This could be

disastrous. Charity frequently impoverishes those who give and does not enrich those who receive if, in the process, the integrity of personality of the recipient is violated. Such violation cannot help but take place if strings are attached to the gifts made.

Basic *human* values must be kept foremost in the projected programs. Such programs must be built on the philosophy of cultural pluralism rather than deadening uniformity. This philosophy has been taught by Dean E. George Payne for many years.

The viewpoints expressed in the articles are not necessarily those of the Editorial Board, but they are, we hope, enough of a crystallization of thought from the countries dealt with that they will be a guide for our readers' thinking about postwar reconstruction.

DAN W. DODSON

IDEOLOGIES AND THE COMING EUROPE

Feliks Gross

Postwar educational trends in Europe may, in many respects, depend upon philosophies and background ideologies which the European peoples will voluntarily or involuntarily follow. Since religion lost its determining position in this field, philosophies and background ideologies have become, in an indirect sense, even more important factors in educational trends and policy.

Fascism, nazism, and communism decisively influenced the educational philosophies of Italy, Germany, and Russia. In a democratic society there is a greater variation in ideologies and educational policies, thanks to its ideological and philosophical pluralism. Don Luigi Sturzo discusses this problem most ably in his contribution. There have been various trends in education, but the democratic philosophy was still the backbone of these trends in countries where democracy was not a slogan but a way of life.

What will be the background philosophy and the ideologies of

European peoples after the war is of primary importance for post-war educational reconstruction. The vague reply to the effect that this education will be democratic is not satisfactory: the meaning of "democratic" must be adequately defined. Furthermore, democracy in many countries is regarded as a problem of form not of content—a form for the free development of ideas. Finally, there is no certainty that we are going to have democracy in Europe after the war. Above all, European philosophical and ideological backgrounds will be shaped by several existent factors.

First, Europe will be divided into military spheres. Consequently, the dominant power—the controlling ally or conqueror as in the case of Germany—will willingly or unwillingly exert its ideological influence to a greater or lesser degree. For instance, Germany's ideological background will definitely be influenced by the occupation, but nazism will still be a tremendous problem after the war. Even among the anti-nazis, educated in nazified schools, there have developed reactions which are entirely alien to our ethical principles.

Second, Europe's economic and social conditions will be powerful factors in its ideological development. And, third, there will be a struggle between two conflicting kinds of ideologies: the various ideologies of the underground and the remnants of the philosophies introduced by the totalitarian conquerors and rulers which also found acceptance because of the already existing domestic trends of chauvinism.

The emphasis in the news on the heroic resistance of the oppressed peoples overshadows two facts: that everywhere more or less large groups collaborated with the nazis; that, willy-nilly, nazi propaganda acting through various channels, the schools for instance, poisoned a number of characters. Collaborationism was a disease which affected not only individuals but also groups; and even in the resisting countries of Eastern Europe where resistance movements occupied a dominant position from the very beginning nazi occupation must have left some traces. It would be a mistake, there-

fore, to base our opinions of these countries solely on their resistance movements and the patriotic spirit of a part of the population.

There is also another aspect to this problem: one of the results of nazi conquest is appeasement. There were many individuals who compromised with evil and even with crime and who assimilated methods of settling their affairs that will probably be carried over into the future. The new philosophies and ideologies coming from the underground will have to meet these realities and to cope with them.

But there is more than just one "underground ideology." A great bulk of the underground movement is *in sensu largo* an equalitarian movement—socialist, populist, peasant, and democratic. The background philosophy is frequently of a socialist character, but strong humanistic and federalistic (advocating a federal solution in Europe and a world organization) tendencies are apparent.

The individual, not the state, is the supreme end and the essence of this humanistic philosophy. The authority of the state under the influence of totalitarianism became a plaything for whomever the common people were forced to sacrifice themselves. For the common man it meant oppression and "Polizeistaat" (Police State) where nearly every one was more or less suspected and prisons became national institutions. Moreover, nazism and fascism have brought about an anti-ethical attitude toward life. Oppression and contempt for the weaker, even for the physically weaker, have replaced mutual help and support.

In short, the peoples of Europe have witnessed such an amount of crime, cruelty, and evil that many have come to realize that our basic rules of decency, our very ethical principles, are right now at stake; and that, notwithstanding the various political shadows, we must unite in order to re-establish this very basis of a true society. This is the core of neohumanistic European tendencies.

Then there is the communist philosophy with a smaller following than is generally realized in this country, which derives its strength from the military success and support of the Soviet Union.

Also, nationalism is not yet dead. In fact all underground movements were greatly imbued with national feeling in their reaction to national oppression. This feeling ranged in intensity from patriotism to extreme nationalism, and even the communist movement was nationalistic in character and employed nationalistic slogans. The milder form of nationalism reconciled itself with federal ideas. Although nationalism will not disappear entirely after the war and will certainly play a part in ideological developments, its dangers can be avoided by strengthening the federalistic and humanistic tendencies.

Rightist groups are mostly compromised because of their collaboration with the nazis (as in France), and the role of those in the underground struggle who did not collaborate was relatively small.

The "underground ideologies" after liberation are becoming "the postwar ideologies and background philosophies" in their initial stage.

Which of them will be the strongest, which of them will rule? The populist, socialist, and democratic movements strongly influenced by humanistic ideas certainly play an essential part at present. But their future strength will also depend upon outside backing—and in Eastern Europe the communists are the favored ones.

Perhaps some of the really important currents are still undetectable. In 1916 only a few predicted the great success of the bolsheviks, and fascism and nazism were not yet born. Perhaps some of the great currents will still appear quite unexpectedly.

Europe needs a rebirth of humanistic values and a democratic framework to enable various philosophies and ideologies so characteristic of European culture to develop. But whether there will be the opportunity for such a development depends upon many factors, some of which are independent of the peoples involved.

Feliks Gross is Secretary-General of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, adviser to the Polish Government's Information Center, and editor of *New Europe*. Author of the recently published *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe*.

IN FRANCE: RESISTANCE AND HUMANISM

Paul Vignaux

For the past four years the substance of French life has been called *resistance*, a word full of meaning. André Gide has written: "To resist is to act and it is not always by the affirmative that the individual affirms himself." What is this conception of man that the French expressed in their act of resistance? Has the French humanism acquired some new traits after this trial of four years?

In order to answer this question clearly, one must remember that modern France has been in a state of dialogue with herself for centuries—dialogue between Christian humanism and secular humanism.

The outstanding publication of religious resistance, which was also the richest in thought among the underground publications, *Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien* (Notebooks of Christian Testimony), has been chiefly the revival, in the face of the enemy, of the leading ideas of Catholic French renaissance between the two wars. Historians of religious sentiment, who will look in these *Cahiers* for the spirituality of the resistance, will be able to define it as a *spirituality befriending reason*. To the anti-Semitic who want to exclude the Jews from the French community, the *Cahiers* answer: "We should like them to know what is the nature of this mysterious community which possesses its members through the fatality of flesh and blood. Would it be that the French nation is so foreign to the principles and influence of reason?" Against nazism, these Christians of France do not only invoke the Word of God, they still defend a rationalistic conception of human society; and although convinced of the eminent value of charity, they maintain the classical request of the secular humanism imbued with the idea of justice: "There are moments when one must not yield and when justice dominates charity. The charity which permits justice to die in the conscience of men is a false charity, a

weakness unworthy of a Christian." In order to measure the resonance of such words in the spiritual history of France, one must remember Proudhon. Proudhon considered the idea of Justice as the very principle of the opposition, irreconcilable, according to him, between the Revolution and the Church. The Christians of the resistance wanted to surmount this opposition. They were led to this undertaking by the thinking of such men as Jacques Maritain, who have pointed out in Christianity a source of integral humanism, of heroic humanism.

It seems, that, between the two wars, the success in France of a new Christian humanism is due, in part at least, to the deficiencies of the secular humanism. The philosophy of Leon Brunschvicg, the last of the great French philosophies of progress, was doubtless in its last stages on the eve of the war and during this war itself a humanism. But in its inception, the wisdom of Brunschvicg belongs to the last years of the nineteenth century, to this great epoch of the French university that was the Dreyfus Affair. Still, in a group of the resistance itself, in the group Combat of Paris, we discover a new form of secular humanism—the one which emerges from the *philosophy of the absurd* of Albert Camus or of the *existentialism* of Jean Paul Sartre. Sartre is not afraid to refer to Heidegger. He believes intellectual autarchy just as dangerous as economic autarchy. But anguish for him "does not distinguish itself from the sense of responsibilities"; "despair is but one and the same with the will; with despair begins a true optimism; the optimism of a man who knows he has no rights and nothing is due to him, who rejoices in counting on himself alone and in acting alone for the good of all." "Here is," says Sartre, "this motto of man that we do our own: to do and through doing to do oneself and to be nothing else than that one has done oneself." This can be a motto for the young men of Combat who have inscribed in the front of their paper, the most excellently written and thought of the Parisian dailies, "From the resistance to the revolution." For

the first four months of the liberation, Albert Camus wrote the editorials of *Combat*. This work being, according to him, "the exercise of some rules of conscience which politics, it seems to us, has not made, up to now, much use of." Camus enters public life as a moralist, with the thought in mind both of the drama of a France and a Europe exhausted by two wars and the conviction that "no human task is impossible to man; men are only and precisely what we need." Such is the language of *Combat*: "the language of a generation brought up in the sight of injustice, a generation ignoring God, loving man and resolved to serve him against a destiny so often unreasonable."

The humanism of these unbelievers, as that of Maritain, is essentially *antitotalitarian*. Still the Christians who see God beyond the world could say with Camus: "the human person embodies all we respect in the world." The ones and the others are facing the same problem: when passing from resistance to revolution, one must pass from ethics to politics; moral philosophy was perhaps enough to resist, to refuse the national-socialism and the hypocrisy of Vichy. But now these same men who condemned both fascism and all realistic politics must find a political creed. At the same time that it turns its attention toward public life, the new French humanism must not lose sight of its foundations: man, no longer as "a nature fixed for ever," but man as a historical being. In this search, it must not be forgotten that "France, having lost her material power, cannot afford this luxury, to lie." It is once again Albert Camus who reminds his friends of these words of a French writer: "If I am not clear, my entire world is annihilated." Let us wish with him, to France, for the benefit of Europe, "the courage of clear thinking."

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LAOCRACY VERSUS CONSERVATISM IN GREECE

Basil John Vlavianos

Perhaps there is no better proof that we are living in "One World" than the striking similarity of the ideological trends that prevail in various nations today. Everywhere there is an impulse toward the integration of popular forces which would provide a new solution to the age-old conflict between progress and conservatism.

In Greece this impulse found its expression in the popular resistance movement represented primarily by the coalition of political parties known as the National Liberation Front or EAM.

These parties, usually designated as leftist, are inspired by the ideology of laocracy.

They use this word to express an ideological combination of liberalism and socialism, covering the broad field of ideas which pertain to the moral, material, and intellectual advancement of the common man. The entire literature of the EAM is animated by this ideology.

In the political domain, laocracy implies a democratic form of government with popular institutions, free elections, secret ballot, equal right for men and women to vote. Laocracy seeks freedom of speech, press, and religion of organization and association, freedom from want and fear. It calls for the fair administration of justice and for the democratization of the armed forces.

In the economic field, laocracy stands for the abolition of many old-fashioned taxes and assessments which have prevented free development in the production and circulation of goods and which have placed an unreasonable burden upon the consumer. Laocracy would nationalize the big banks, the heavy industries, and the chief means of communication. It would bring the benefits of modern science to agricultural and industrial production and to the exploitation of the natural wealth of the country. Under a laocratic regime, the great estates would be expropriated and the peasant would enjoy a maximum of economic independence.

In the social sphere, laocracy favors substantial care for the poor and middle classes, social-security insurance against death, illness, accident, old age, disability, and unemployment, better working and living conditions in urban and rural areas, extensive public works, social service, protection of the public health, the provision of adequate recreational facilities.

Internationally, laocracy looks toward a peaceful policy of understanding and collaboration among nations. Those who espouse the ideal of laocracy in Greece consider that they are justified in demanding respect for its freedom, independence, and territorial integrity. This attitude is well illustrated by an appeal made during the Axis occupation by a secret organization of the women of Greece to the free women of the world. After describing their own plight, they said this:

We wish you to give us a great promise. The promise that tomorrow, when the hour of victory will strike, united together we shall ask and even demand the creation of a new world, free of any tyrannical forms, without arms and destruction, a world based on personal liberty and universal social justice.

In the intellectual domain, laocracy defends the fundamental principles of liberalism and seeks the greatest possible cultural advancement of the people. It favors obligatory and free education, the creation of popular universities and scientific centers, the encouragement of scientific, literary, and artistic endeavor. The followers of laocracy in Greece are proud of their great intellectual and cultural heritage, but they condemn any rigid adherence to the past. They believe in a neohellenic civilization and in the ability of the people to reach new cultural heights. Toward that end, they believe, people must concentrate upon contemporary realities, using their great traditions and knowledge of the great achievements of their ancestors only as a stimulus to their own creative activity. Their conviction is that respect for the past can be better manifested by greater

confidence in themselves and in the future and that what Greece needs is to place emphasis on progress rather than on tradition.

Conservatism, as the term is used here, is the ideology expounded by those who want and fight to conserve their privileges. It is the antithesis of everything that would endanger those privileges and, consequently, of every force that would strengthen the position of the common man. It is represented by the right-wing parties and especially the royalists and, of course, by the few fascists active in Greece.

The conservative elements favor the continuation of the monarchy and generally of autocratic regimes or at least of a democracy for the privileged ones, as against a government of popular democracy. They want a kind of limited freedom that would entail the enforcement of "order" by a more or less centralized administration. They oppose any heavy taxation on wealth or any bold social reform. And as they adhere to outmoded political and economic theories, so do they preach a passive and servile acceptance of the ancient Greek civilization, thus inhibiting true creative effort.

Greek conservative elements try to distract popular attention from their antipopular stand in internal affairs by a strident nationalism. They present themselves as the sole defenders of Greek territorial claims and accuse their opponents of neglecting them. An utterly false accusation.

The conflict between laocracy and conservatism in Greece is well illustrated by the long controversy over language. When Greece regained its freedom in 1828, it was faced with an acute linguistic problem. There were at least four variations of the Greek language in use at the time: classical Greek, medieval ecclesiastical, the language of the educated classes, and the vernacular spoken by the masses. Both the ancient and the medieval Greek that came down to us were literary rather than spoken languages. True, the medieval ecclesiastical Greek was used by the Greek Orthodox Church, but

even the priests had difficulty in understanding it. The Greek spoken by the educated classes was an amalgom of classical, Byzantine, and modern vernacular. It varied according to persons and circumstances, having no rules of grammar or syntax.

During the first decades of the nineteenth century, two schools of thought grew up, each calling for a different solution of the linguistic problem. They have quarreled continuously and, perhaps, will continue to quarrel even now, after the adoption of the popular language by the government. One school was for the recognition and cultivation of the language spoken and understood by the people; the other for the closest possible return to the ancient Greek. This group tried to relate the question of language to nationalistic considerations and believed, like Herder and Fichte, that national continuity and homogeneity would be guaranteed by the revival of the old language. Later, when the study of linguistic laws had established the complete impossibility of checking the evolution of a language, this school continued to stick to its guns, partly out of ignorance, partly out of hostility to an expression of the people's aspirations.

During the first part of this century, the fight for the vernacular language assumed far greater importance than ever before, for the division between the forces of reaction and of progress grew deeper.

The controversy spread to the entire field of education. The struggle between classical and what has been called modern education became acute. The progressive parties started an intensive educational reform. It was one of the many aspects of the reform made imperative in the early years of the century by the increasing industrialization of the country and its territorial expansion after the Balkan wars (1912-1913) and World War I. To change the existing villages before 1919 into cities and industrial centers, it was necessary to equip the masses and the elite of the nation with new intellectual tools.

The conservatives, whenever they have been in power, have always

tried to block reform. They rarely, however, kept the controversy on a scientific level and they did not hesitate to attack their opponents in the most unfair manner and to accuse some of the best contemporary minds in Greece of being communists, atheists, and enemies of family life. Some were even accused of vegetarianism, which was presented as a new device of the devil.

It is not coincidental that the long struggle over modern Greek language was finally concluded by the National Council, elected during the German occupation. At an historic session on May 27, 1944, held at Koryschades, a small mountain village of central Greece, the National Council decided that the "official language of Greece for all the manifestation of public life and all the degrees of instruction" should be "the language of the people." And the decision has been adopted also by the present Greek Government.

The laocratic movement is today closer than ever to materializing its ideas. The reactionary elements inside the country have lost much of their strength. If they are not bolstered by reactionary interests abroad, they will no longer be able to frustrate the normal development of the progressive forces in the country—forces that are part of the people's movement everywhere.

Basil John Vlavianos is the publisher and editor of *The National Herald*, Greek-language daily newspaper in New York. He is one of the best informed persons concerning conditions inside Greece today. He has repeatedly represented Greece at various international congresses and is the author of several scientific treatises and of numerous articles on Greek and international affairs.

THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF FUTURE SPAIN*

Alfredo Mendizabal

If it is difficult to predict what the different peoples of Europe, who have taken a direct part in the war, will be like, in the near post-

* Translated by Marie Calvet.

war world, then it is even more difficult to foresee the future of Spain, in view of its peculiar international situation, as well as by virtue of its own emotional, political, and social reactions. The unpredictable is, there, an element which one must always expect and the unexpected appears to be a paradox, because it does not always follow ordinary logic. It surprises and disconcerts one. But it has its internal logic, even though it may escape our forecasts.

The events within Spain follow a different pattern from that of other nations. But in the present catastrophe, Spain was the country to give the first warning. Within the country and at her own expense was presented the bloody prologue to the drama whose enactment one observes clearly, but whose epilogue one cannot foretell. The characters of the prologue are, nevertheless, the same ones who appear in the remaining scenes of the drama in the grand theater of the world. On this world stage have been projected, since 1939, the same forces that clashed in Spain since 1936. The same forces and a few more, inasmuch as the democracies, who had closed their eyes and ears to the terrible conflict in its preliminary Spanish phase, were to enter upon the scene precisely because they did not know how or did not want to (I shall not say that they were not able) cut at the roots of the evil. The Spanish War had been an international *coup d'état*. Its prolongation has been and is today a civil war of the world. And if during its development quite a few contingent factors have altered the respective initial positions, upon coming out of the blood bath, numerous peoples of Europe whose vital aspiration was liberty show themselves vacillating and obfuscated by the totalitarian temptation. One of the gravest mischiefs of the dictatorial regimes experimented in Europe is that internal dialectic system that develops in the mentality of peoples a "reactionary" tendency, in the etymological sense of the word. Against a type of tyranny, there are people who see no other remedy but an opposite tyranny. The fear of one extreme may cause one to fall into the opposite extreme if it is forgotten that solutions exist which escape the stupid dilemma.

Spain is an example, in this aspect, of what one ought not to do. In 1931, on the proclamation of the republic, Spain had no fascists or communists worthy of consideration. But Don Quixote wanted to continue to challenge the windmills to combat. Antifascism and anticommunism brought to a white heat by a phenomenon of reaction brought about the feared result. That is how democracy found itself helpless, between opposite tendencies that only coincided in being antiliberal.

A violent pendular movement has periodically jolted Spain since 1923, when the constitutional monarchy forsook its legal basis in embarking on a dictatorial adventure. The first natural implication of that fundamental deviation was the abolishment of the absolute regime, as soon as it lacked the material support of a military dictatorship. On the establishment of the republic, the exemplary act of having changed the regime without the loss of a drop of blood could have made one believe that the Spaniards had finally found the social and political equilibrium which could give stability to the new institutions. This is what the liberals of the moderate groups of the right and left were trying to do, attempting to constitute a central zone that would avoid violent shake-ups. But the same good will failed to appear in the extremists, many of whom deplored the absence of revolutionary violence; and the sectarianism of the parties of the left quickly came to the front in the election for "Constituent Cortes" and in the constitutional legislation, especially under the aspect of measures against the liberty of the Catholics (who numbered a majority in the country) and against the religious congregations. Instead of attracting to the republic the elements which, having been monarchial, were on the whole willing to accept the new regime, they tried to separate themselves and proscribe themselves from them. Resentment dominated on both sides and the intolerant wing of the parties of the right instead of fighting with legal methods that it still had at its disposal decided to conspire against the regime. The opposition between the right and left be-

came irreconcilable. And when the constituent period passed, the moderate wing of the rightists attended the new election and tried, after attaining an electoral victory, to change the direction of the republic, the reticence with which it resigned itself to tolerate the regime, rather than to accept it loyally, gave the republicans the impression that monarchism and even semifascist reaction was trying to conquer the fortress of the republic by boring from within. Socialists, anarchists, and communists rose against the government in 1934, when they saw it in the hands of their adversaries, as later, in 1936, after the electoral triumph of the Popular Front, the monarchists, traditionalists, and falangists rose against the reaction of the left and hurled themselves into the Civil War. The stupidity, the provocations, and the intransigency of the extreme elements of one side and the other deepened the abyss that separated the opposing violent minorities, while the large majority of the Spanish public, that was neither fascist nor communist, saw itself unable to restore the necessary equilibrium, exactly because of its manner of reacting to changing situations, in which the republic was dominated by groups that declared their incompatibility for each other.

The Civil War managed to polarize about the most violent minority parties, the whole life of the country; and the triumph of the insurrection headed by General Franco with the direct support of Hitler and Mussolini succeeded in establishing the falangist regime, which is repugnant to the majority of the Spanish people and not only to the republicans. Barely 15 per cent of the country supports the ferocious dictatorship that oppresses the rest of the nation, but this does not mean that the ideal of the nonconformists rests upon the simple and pure return of the Popular Front. Even among exiled republicans, those who have a great feeling of responsibility consider that hypothesis as a catastrophe. The restoration of the republic appears as the only exit for the Spanish labyrinth that can be considered as a solution—if the political groups of the old republican and workers' organizations do not persist in following the methods

that gave such bad results in the past; if the republic tries to unite, instead of splitting, the Spanish people; if a constructive feeling is reached instead of a spirit of revenge; if force is excluded as an instrument of political action; if it restored in short a juridical order.

The characteristics of the present system, the totalitarian dictatorship of fascist inspiration, are the most opposed imaginable to the democratic conception of the power of the state. A political opportunism of basely Machiavellian pretensions makes the usurper of Spanish sovereignty cooperate with the democracies, namely, America and Great Britain, in external affairs, while deciding to strengthen the monopoly of the falangists in the internal affairs of the country. In this way it is trying to save itself from the shipwreck into which defeat has thrown Italian Fascism and German Nazism, as well as the regime of Vichy (so ideologically similar to that of Franco). But, the falangist dictatorship was from its birth—and even since its conception—joined indissolubly to the fascist totalitarian constellation, and biologically must disappear with it. Spain's problem is now one of readjustment to a totally different world and, since geographically and historically she is located in the orbit of the democracies, it is a problem of re-adaptation to a system of ideas and political customs from which she had been separated temporarily. And before everything else, it calls for the liquidation of the Civil War; the consequences of a struggle of this kind are graver for the existence of the community than those of an international war, because the old adversaries have to live together on the same soil. When, as in this case, the victor has forgotten all generous principles, the adversaries continue being such and the internal logic of the conflict determines that, once established in terms of a struggle to a finish, the solution will be impossible while no change essentially takes place in the mentality that led to the catastrophe. Because of that there will be no peace in Spain until the spirit of antagonism peculiar to the Spaniards eventually finds its normal level in a democracy capable of canalizing the natural op-

position between the different conceptions of society and of restoring a minimum of civil tolerance without which divergency results in tragedy.

That definition of the essence of politics, which the Nazi jurist Karl Schmidt gave as the differentiation between friend and enemy, has been followed too much by Spaniards not only during the Civil War, but also before and after. To be an anvil or to be a hammer appeared the aspiration of many; and even though when given the choice they preferred the last, the inexorable character of an aggressive position led them successively to one or another extreme. Many men of action passed from the government to prison and vice versa; and in this way politics was imbued with a spirit of resentment or of domination. A complex of oppression and persecutory mania were very frequently the determining motives of political groups. Fear made the war break out and because of fear there is no civil accord.

Does this mean that the situation is unsolvable? By no means. But a great enterprise of psychological disintoxication must be undertaken by the men of good will who may sincerely try to overcome the basic enmity that has divided Spanish society in two. That enterprise will have to be the starting point of the re-education of the people in the ways of democracy, for democracy, and to guarantee democracy. Myths are now rather worn from constant use. Sincere democrats, men of true liberal spirit, were very scarce among rulers and were not successful in awakening enthusiasm for the supreme values of political liberty. The negative programs of simple opposition were those that led the masses to crime and heroism. Violence had gained possession of the souls even before feeding upon the bodies; and all the relations of human conviviency were ruined by the fratricidal soul of a few, of which the majority was the innocent victim.

Desperately, Spain today looks for a way out of her own labyrinth. There is only one light capable of guiding her, that of freeing her

from the myth of systematic violence; there is only one instrument that is able to break the chains without substituting for them others of a different color but of similar slavery, that instrument is Justice. There is but one regime capable of giving again to Spain livable conditions, Democracy! A democracy sincerely felt and practised, that is decided by the will of the majority, that will which in the tumult of the armed struggle cannot make itself heard, and that has in mind and respects the rights of the minority. In the near future there will be presented a favorable opportunity for such an enterprise. The Spanish people themselves will have the task of directing it; and the other countries who proclaim themselves defenders of liberty must not hinder them. If the path of Spain should be turned anew, Europe will not entirely have come out of the darkness of night.

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CZECHOSLOVAK TRADITION AND GERMAN IMPERIALISM

Jan Munzer

The question of the ideological orientation of Czechoslovakia today and tomorrow cannot be dealt with separately from the general orientation of Europe. Not only in the case of Czechoslovakia but all over the world this question poses itself with greater urgency than ever before in world history, and in a world situation in which moral and ideological values cannot be separated from the political and economic values advocated by different political movements. Not only liquidation of war among different states is at stake. The real issue is the establishment of a new epoch of world organization for a long time to come, of an organization which should be de-

voted to definite beliefs and goals. In the first instance, the goal of this war is and will be the defeat of German-Japanese aggression. In a wider and deeper sense, this war will reach a definite conclusion only after and if it will lead toward the beginning of a new world organization, viz., an organization that would render impossible any such aggression and any periodical outbursts of imperialism.

The crisis into which the Czechoslovak nation and especially its intelligentsia was thrown, not only as late as 1938 (Munich) but already at about 1933 when the wavering attitude of the world toward German imperialism began to be apparent, was, consequently, just a part of the world crisis. It must be judged from this viewpoint. It goes without saying, however, that this Czechoslovak crisis had its own specific features, conditioned by the general situation of Czechoslovakia, her national tradition, and her main ideological schools.

As far as the general situation is concerned, it seems not unimportant to stress that Czechoslovakia, of all the countries occupied by the Germans, has the most unfavorable geographic position. She is surrounded by Germany from three sides (north, west, and south) and has no access to any sea. The fact itself that Czechoslovakia, in spite of this, energetically refused to collaborate with Hitler's Germany from the very beginning points to the existence of an ideological orientation which was much too strong and definite to be influenced by considerations of opportunism. These opportunist considerations were not entirely nonexistent even in Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, they were noisily advocated by some small but powerful groups. But just the fact that this propaganda achieved nothing shows that the Czechoslovak nation as a whole was ideologically firmly welded.

One of the reasons for this ideological solidarity was the belief that the outside world was and would stay united in the fight against pure power, the belief in the reasonableness and resolution of the

civilized world. Czechoslovakia believed that this civilized world would not permit Germany to repeat her criminal attempt of 1914. The attitude since 1933 of the progressive world toward Germany became, however, a source of steady irritation for Czechoslovakia, with its climax in Munich which led to such a crisis there as has hardly been experienced by any other nation in modern times. Just because the prevalence of reason, decency, morality, and justice was considered an axiom, the repudiation of all these at Munich led to a deeper crisis in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere. Those nations which were intentionally or unintentionally educated toward a moral and political skepticism, nihilism, and relativism under the screen of practical opportunism were affected to a much smaller degree.

This crisis was documented by the writings of many Czechoslovak writers, scientists, etc., and was outwardly manifested by the sudden death of Karel Čapek, a typical representative of modern Czechoslovak intelligentsia. His death was justly explained as a consequence of the fact that he "lost his world." The conception on which the Czechoslovak state was founded politically and on which all Czechoslovak realities in the realm of culture, morality, and economy were built was suddenly destroyed and the axiom of yesterday had no validity at all today.

Despair was the natural reaction of a nation which found itself abandoned and left to the mercy of an immeasurably stronger enemy. More typical though was the fact that, in the very first days after Munich, leading Czechoslovak intellectuals held to the thesis that this situation was only temporary, although it might last for some time, but they openly and expressly refused any one-sided orientation toward Germany. And when George Duhamel, several days after Munich, wrote that now that the Maginot line had been lost to Central Europe and care must be taken to preserve the Descartes line, in this region, his declaration found enthusiastic re-

sponse in Czechoslovakia. The majority of the population believed that Munich had been a "de facto" solution, certain that it would not prevail in the long run.

This belief was founded on the national Czechoslovak tradition which dates back to the fourteenth century. And since the nineties, it had been deepened and actualized by Thomas Masaryk whose influence on the Czechoslovak people is probably without analogy in other nations of the modern world, and who, through his life work, changed this historical tradition into a political reality. This tradition had its roots in the writings of Jan Hus, Petr Chelčický, Jan Amos Komenský, and continues in the works of the Slovak Jan Kollár, of the "Awakeners" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reaching its culmination in the teachings of Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš. All these leaders followed supranational, universal, humanitarian goals. Jan Hus not only fought the Germans and established modern Czechoslovak orthography but also advocated the reform of the church in the interests of mankind. Kòmenský (Comenius) not only formulated axioms to which the nation always (even today) recurs in times of emergency but he worked for the establishment of a universal academy which would support the idea of eternal peace and international cooperation. Thomas Masaryk not only revitalized the Czechoslovak state but also in the spirit of his "Ideals of Humanity" fought with Eduard Beneš for the idea of collective security. Many more names could be added, especially that of the Hussite King George of Poděbrady who as early as 1465 advocated the establishment of a League of Nations.

The tradition symbolized by these names was so strongly and firmly rooted in the nation that it survived the three centuries (from the seventeenth to the twentieth) when its cultural and political life all but vanished within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Just as the Czech King, Charles IV, in the fourteenth century leaned toward the culture of the West, the Czechoslovak "Awakening" also deliberately orientated itself to the West, fighting

the strong influence of German Romanticism. The first modern Czech journalist, Karel Havlíček, acquainted his readers first with the Anglo-Saxon world, following the work of one of the outstanding "Awakeners," Josef Jungmann, the author of the first Czech dictionary. Jungmann, dissatisfied with only national activities, translated Milton's *Paradise Lost* into Czech. The work of the "Awakeners" finished, another period of high significance dawned, that of "opening the windows toward Europe" which meant, first of all, translations of Anglo-Saxon and Roman literature. Today, there is no important literary work of western literature that has not (and even repeatedly) been translated into Czech or Slovak. All these activities proved, first of all, the deep affinity to western culture but, second, they also proved the determination of Czechoslovak cultural leaders to defend the cultural life of their nation against the overwhelming German influence lavishly supported by Vienna and Berlin. It goes without saying that later on much attention was given to Russian culture, mainly literature.

A very strong influence of German thought on Czechoslovak cultural development was due to geographical and political reasons quite unavoidable, but the consistent struggle to reduce this influence and to supplant it by the influence of western culture shows the determination with which the nation, subjugated politically by the Germans and Magyars, tried to prevent political enslavement being climaxed by cultural bondage. This cultural struggle bore, however, no marks of vulgar chauvinism. As has been stated before, a strong German influence did exist, not only due to Kant or Goethe but also to minor stars on the heaven of classical Germany which were known and ably translated. This influence, however, existed in a steady parallel with western culture and, while German culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was respected, western culture was truly admired and loved. This is very understandable in the case of thinkers and writers like Fichte or Kleist and historians like Treitschke and Mommsen.

The average Czechoslovak intellectual always looked with suspicion at all types of German mysticism with its search of the "Absolute" and its identification once with God, once with a transcendental Thing-in-itself, once with the State. Czechoslovak rationalism was always aroused by German mysticism and in this it found support in the thought of the western world, the influence of which was consistently and perhaps just for this reason (among others) supported by all spiritual leaders of the nation for many centuries. French and Anglo-Saxon philosophy were in much greater harmony with the sober Czechoslovak mind than, for example, German idealism which, it is true, constructed monumental systems but left them hanging in the air while western European thought consistently kept in touch with experience and reality. For this reason, there really was a Descartes line in Czechoslovakia, the line of clear thought, but never was there a Kant line. For this reason, also, Masaryk speaks of Kant with respect but always critically and seldom or perhaps never with admiration. His apriorism seemed mythical to him and this judgment is typical of the sober average Czechoslovak who looks rather for truth and knowledge than for "monumental" systems.

Under these circumstances, it is quite natural that the ideological and political struggle against German imperialism was initiated in Czechoslovakia—under the slogan of a fight against irrationalism. If, to the sober Czechoslovak mind, even Kant seemed mythical, this designation applied the more to Hitler's ideologist Rosenberg with his "Myth of the 20th Century." The neo-German myth of "Blut und Boden" of the "Nordic Race," etc., conflicted not only in its political implications but, first, in its ideological conception to all general views common in Czechoslovakia. To the Czechoslovak mind this ideology (which is not an ideology at all but rather a mixture of very flexible slogans) seemed not only dangerous but chiefly strange and even ridiculous.

There is no doubt that this rational attitude which survived so

many centuries will also survive this period of German occupation. There is even less doubt of the fact that just this attitude was and is the strongest inspiration of the nation in its fight against the Germans. Although Czechoslovakia lost many of her spiritual leaders in this fight, there will be no change in this attitude because its roots were not only in the intelligentsia but in the whole of the national body, in the common man who inherited these truths even if he was unable to express them in literary form. And concerning those lost spiritual leaders, the nation knows that they were warriors in the battle between irate irrationalism and cultural, humanistic rationalism.

Another question which can be posed is whether the civilized world which failed at Munich will be sensible and courageous enough to fortify, after the defeat of the Germans, the positions which it gave up at Munich and whether it will find a reasonable solution for universal cooperation, a cooperation including the Soviet Union. On this, however, rests not only the fate of individual European countries, but of the whole of modern civilization.

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IDEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS IN ITALY

Luigi Sturzo

Professor H. Kantorowicz, before going as an exile to England, taught for three years, in the late twenties and early thirties, in the faculty of law at the University of Florence. He told me that he never met an openly fascist student, while many were either neutral or skeptical or against the fascist regime. This testimonial of an intelligent and cultured observer confirmed my own personal information. I do not mean to say that a good many young people, belonging to the middle classes, had not felt attracted toward fas-

cism during their elementary- and high-school education, and had not even participated with enthusiasm in the activities of the fascist youth organizations. Some of them were also members of the party. This is not to exclude, furthermore, that a good many of them were convinced fascists in the nationalistic or imperialistic meaning of the word. But it was a well-known fact that, as these youths progressed in their studies, so their early enthusiasm and faith concerning fascism decreased. In this stage, they would go over to a period of silent self-criticism, which would bring them to skepticism, owing to their intellectual immaturity, or to a negative or incoherent reaction, even verging on anarchism. On the other hand, given the totalitarian rule, any reaction against fascism would lead to an escape from politics in favor of a superior idealism. Such idealism found nourishment in Croce's idealistic philosophy or in the Thomistic speculations of catholic groups.

Only a minority of students and intellectuals entered an active policy of resistance to fascism, following the traditional lines of political parties or other social-political groups. The Italian underground is twenty years old, having started in January 1925 when the full-fledged totalitarian dictatorship was born. After the last opposition put up by the members of the Chamber of Deputies following the murder of Matteotti (the so-called Aventino), the underground movement was started, in a fitful and uncoordinated way at the beginning and without any common purpose. Needless to say, the younger generation was always a very important element in this picture. The last phase of the Italian underground started at the beginning of 1942, when a number of parties joined hands, the same which later formed the Committees of National Liberation: the Communist, the Socialist, the Christian-Democratic, the Action, the Liberal, and the Democracy of Labor parties. These various parties appealed to political ideologies which are bound with the philosophical and social traditions going back to the period of the Italian Risorgimento.

Those who object to the multiparty traditions of Europeans fail to take into account the fact that in Italy, in France, and in Germany parties are more than mouthpieces of class or economic interests whose acceptance is sought by the State, but have ideological and extrapolitical principles and finality. In the beginning, Europe knew the two-party system, both parties stemming from the bourgeoisie: the Conservative right and the Liberal left. But at once new factors split the bourgeoisie in monarchical and antimonarchical groups, clerical and anticlerical, democratic and antidemocratic. Soon afterwards the working masses, having or not having obtained universal suffrage, freed themselves from the political tutelage of the capitalistic bourgeoisie and evolved political movements of their own, as Socialists, Christian-Democrats, or Communists, often with a fluctuating party organization and several ramifications.

In Italy the principal tradition of the bourgeoisie is a liberal, monarchical, and lay one: lay in the sense of being opposed to the temporal power of the Popes and to the political influence of the Church. There is also a more aggressive laicism, of anti-Catholic and Masonic derivation, which is to be found in some advanced groups. The Mazzinian tradition is kept alive by the Republicans who have, however, dropped the first part of the Mazzinian slogan "God and People." The democracy of Italian liberals is conceived as the natural development of liberalism, following the method of freedom and of parliamentary procedure, in so far as realizing popular will and bringing about gradual reforms. The theoretical premises of Italian liberalism in a century have shifted from rationalism to positivism, of which Mosca was an able political interpreter, and to Hegelian idealism to be found in the two great antagonists, Croce and Gentile, and the most authoritative historian, Professor Guido De Ruggiero. The common basis of these philosophical currents has been an absolute naturalism, and even though a good many liberals were, in their own ways, religious and catholic, in their conviction if not in practice. Their intellectual molding was founded upon the above men-

tioned philosophical currents which, often, in teaching and in politics, were merged in a critical eclecticism or degenerated in a decadent agnosticism.

The radicals and the Democrats, at bottom antiliberal, had belonged in the past to the positivistic school: their philosopher was Ardigó, their sociologist Pareto, their criminologist Lombroso, and their pedagogist Credaro. With regard to the Socialists, their inspirers were first Marx and later Sorel, while the Communists, last to arrive upon the political scene, used Marx through Lenin. In essence, the theoretical basis of both movements (I do not say parties) is the materialistic conception of history and the fatality of the class struggle which is to lead in the end to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Christian-Democrats have as their intellectual forebears two great Frenchmen of the beginning of the nineteenth century, Lacordaire and Ozanam, and a Sicilian, Gioacchino Ventura. But the movement developed fully only at the end of the century, with Leo XIII, and its moral leader in Italy was the economist and sociologist Giuseppe Toniolo. Christian-Democracy has its own political conception which is not to be confused with catholicism, which is a religion, nor does it limit itself to a mere defense of religious values. Its philosophical conception stresses the values of human personality, the organicism of society, both national and international, the equality of political and juridical rights without discrimination of race, faith, or social class, and the human and Christian solidarity among men as individuals or organized in groups. The Christian point of view is brought to bear as meeting the need of a morality in politics which historically and philosophically cannot but be a Christian one for peoples of Christian civilization.

These currents have influenced the formation of political parties. The historical and ideological tie with prefascist parties has not been broken. Rather, each of today's parties goes back to the policies, the outlook, and the men of the past, even though at present not all of

this past is being accepted, as in the case of the Liberals. From this point of view fascism is a closed incident. Unhappily, all the effects of the fascist adventure will not be canceled, even after a long time and even after a long and painful fight against its poison.

For this reason, all the orientations of the past are not satisfactory and we must seek new ones toward the attainment of which to guide our young people. Nationalism, as a generic sentiment of love for an oppressed, humiliated, and ruined fatherland, a fatherland which must be completely rebuilt, cannot be suppressed or undervalued. Nationalism in this sense was reborn the same day on which Italy surrendered unconditionally and signed the secret armistice. The colonial question has a bearing on this problem, even though prefascist Italian colonies were of little consequence. But the loss of the colonies imposed from the outside will be the source of popular resentment. An even greater source of nationalistic resentment would be the threatened loss of Trieste and other Italian parts of Istria. Undoubtedly the Italian people are prepared to face the hardest fate, but there is no denying that the educational development of the new generation will be greatly influenced by the kind of treatment Italy is going to receive at the hands of those countries who asked that Italy's doors be opened because they were coming as liberators and not as conquerors.

In essence, one of the necessary elements for the spiritual revival of civilized peoples is the reciprocity of ideals, the solidarity of interests, the complete moral pacification. If this is true in the case of France, Belgium, Holland, and other allied countries, the more true is this today in the case of Italy and, tomorrow, in the case of Germany.

The writer has been and is contrary to nationalism, conceived as an egoistic theory which places one's own nation above the others, which thinks of my country right or wrong, which believes the nation to be superior to individuals and groups, the new idol to which everything has to be sacrificed. But I would like to note that

nationalism as well as patriotism, in their human significance, are to be found at the basis of the defense of the rights of every civilized country. For this reason their educational and ideological value contained within the framework of the moral law and of international solidarity cannot be minimized, especially in the countries which are coming out of the present war destroyed and impaired.

The feeling is widely shared that the ideologies and the philosophies to which man can appeal and among which every people is divided in a manifold variety of parties and movements are many. But in reality we find only two philosophies facing each other: the monistic and the dualistic; and only two pedagogical methods: the positivistic and the spiritual; two political systems: the absolutistic or totalitarian and the democratic; two methods: that of freedom and that of authoritarianism. All combinations—as between these poles—are the historical facts with which philosophy, pedagogy, politics, and sociology clothe themselves, as men concretize their ideas in the contrast of ideology and interests. The essence never changes.

Today, after such a destructive war, all peoples, in their striving toward a new life, cannot renounce some ideology upon which to base their sad reality. It is idle to say "try to keep alive," "there is time to think later." Or to say "let the generals, the allies, the improvised leaders take charge." Every man wants to reason about the origins of his misery and wants to look ahead on the path he has to follow, feeling that an impulse moves him in his struggle for existence. He will thus repeat the forms of the past, giving them new names and colors, or he will imagine to have found new forms of social living, hoping to develop new political realities that will correct a past doomed to disappear.

Today, the strongest ideological appeal in Europe comes from communism, not because Europeans believe in a communistic paradise but as a reaction against that kind of capitalism which is believed to be at the root of the present disaster, and out of sympathy

with Russia whose military valor and whose deeds give a romantic tinge to that most prosaic of all social systems. Unhappily, communism is monistic and tries to suppress all natural dualities: that of the individual and society; that of freedom and authority; that of labor and capital; that of spirit and matter; that of religion, or church, and state. Monism is not an exclusive characteristic of communism but it belongs also to that type of capitalism which is to be taken as a degeneration of the use of capital based upon the prevalence of the material interests of one class, which through the exploitation of the democratic forms of society attains an almost complete monopoly of economic and political power. It is true that in a capitalistic regime there still exists a tolerable marginal freedom so that social dynamism can still develop. But, in reality, the above mentioned monopolistic tendencies may so succeed in narrowing that margin that social dynamism becomes inoperative.

All modern efforts aim at the conciliation between the efficiency of a monistic system (communism and capitalism) and the fundamental freedoms of the human personality (the Four Freedoms). Nazism and fascism claimed to be efficient systems based on that extreme monistic conception, totalitarianism. But efficiency without moral limitations and outside of the framework of human freedom and solidarity will only lead to aggression, dictatorship, and war.

The peculiarity of the present ideological positions is that, while all modern philosophies stress everywhere monistic conceptions as against dualistic ones, in the social reality monism reveals itself as antihuman and tends to give all power to those who, be they fascists or nazis, communists, or capitalists, want to become masters of the state. On the other hand, there where the people are still free, where democracy functions, where the dualism of social forces expresses itself not only on the plane of interests but on those of morality, of justice, and of human solidarity, notwithstanding certain deficiencies from the point of view of material efficiency, we will enjoy the advantages of an individual and collective life worthy of free men.

We will be able to acquire all those human values which will lead to the ever greater realization of a true Christian civilization.

This is the path which today is marked not only for Italy and for Europe, but for all those countries which, emerging from this long period of darkness, must so revise their ideological and practical orientations as to be able to resume their normal course of life in an atmosphere of true peace and of reconquered freedom.

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PRESENT IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN POLAND

Manfred Kridl

The soul of all European nations tortured by the Germans during such a terribly long time is a mystery for the outside world. Nobody living under more or less normal conditions can even imagine the state of mind of peoples reduced by the foe to the life of persecuted and tormented animals, and yet trying to salvage their human dignity, their spiritual force, their will to resistance, and their faith in a better future. Under such conditions deep psychological and social changes are inevitable. What we can know about them is only a fraction of this deep internal process which has not as yet developed itself fully; its further evolution cannot be foreseen and may be of great surprise to those who would organize a postwar world along old-fashioned lines not taking into consideration the fundamentally different human material with which they are concerned.

If that is true of all German-occupied nations, it is all the more true of Poland which holds a special place, a mournfully honorable place, in suffering, devastation, number of victims, and also in the disregard shown by her principal allies. The state of the Polish mind is perhaps clearer to us, however, than that of other Central and East European peoples because of the extent to which underground

activities flourished there. The Polish underground was one of the most fully developed and best organized on the Continent, the underground press one of the most numerous and rich, the organization of the "secret state" in Poland one of the most efficient.¹

This, and especially the press consecrated to political, social, cultural, and literary problems, enables us to take a deeper and wider look at the ideological trends of contemporary Poland as reflected in the activity and publications of representatives of the majority of the Polish people; that is, peasants, workers, and working intelligentsia.

The realization of the horrible disaster which befell Poland in September 1939 led quickly to reflections regarding its cause. As early as November 1939 we find in the underground papers long statements explaining the problems in a sincere and sober manner. They contain bold criticism of the policy of the Western states, as well as of that of the Polish government. In spite of an understandable bitterness over the abandoning of Poland by her allies, they do not fail to admit that England and France were not prepared to help. Nor was Poland herself prepared to meet the German blow. This sobriety of view attained so quickly amidst the ruins of the country and the terrible persecutions is a valuable sign of maturity. With this came another conviction: there is no return to the past for either Europe or Poland, if the world and Poland in it are to exist. A really new world must emerge from this global catastrophe based on new social and international foundations. The Polish question is, therefore, seen from a broad international point of view, and in connection with the fundamental rebuilding of Europe and the world. In this way Polish contemporary political thought is renewing the best traditions of the century-long Polish fight for liberty and independence carried on under the slogan, "For your freedom and ours."

¹ I am writing in the past tense, because at present, after the "liberation" of Poland by Soviet troops, the whole movement, the pride of Poland, has almost ceased to exist, destroyed by Soviet agents of Polish origin who call themselves the "Provisional Government."

Such underground publications as *Manifesto of Freedom* (November 1939), *Tribune of the Peoples* (September 1940), *After the September Tragedy* (July 1940), and others state this attitude in a clear and distinct manner.²

In defining the ways of attaining this goal, Polish thought starts from the old and venerable concept of democracy. Notwithstanding all the errors and failures which democracy had undergone since the ancient Republic of Athens, in spite of the fact that it had been so far unable to reach a satisfactory solution of fundamental social problems, there is among the leaders and masses of Poland an unshakable belief that democracy—but only, of course, a regenerated democracy in the pure and noble form conceived by the most prominent thinkers and most devoted fighters of the nineteenth century—is the sole system capable of sustaining European civilization. This implies a flat repudiation of any totalitarianism under whatever form it is disguised. Not only are nazism and fascism contrary to Polish tradition and character (the best proof is the strong opposition against the semidictatorial rule imposed on Poland since 1926), but also the communist kind of totalitarianism.

Democracy is impossible without liberty and liberty is an illusion without social justice and the highest possible degree of equality. The *Program for People's Poland* published by the representatives of the working masses in 1941 proposes such vast social and economic reforms as: a just redistribution of national income, the nationalization of key industries, the expropriation of great landed estates, the expansion of social security, development of the cooperative system, and the like, based on the principle: "Labor as the only title to a share in national income."³

Regarding international relations, the Polish underground stands firmly on the platform of federation. "The Polish Republic," states

² See Kridl, Malinowski, Wittlin, eds., *For Your Freedom and Ours* (New York: F. Ungar, 1943).

³ See *Program for People's Poland* (New York: Polish Labor Group, 1943).

the Program, "will be a member of the Federation of Free European Peoples. In that Federation the Republic will strive to promote a maximum of cohesion and a Federal authority sufficiently powerful to safeguard the Federated Peoples from external aggression, and to suppress all attempts to create internal dissension through excessive nationalism." The same federative principle will be applied to all nationalities living in future Poland.

The Polish leaders realize fully that democracy is not only a system of institutions but also a moral attitude toward the goals of life. They believe that from the ruins and ashes of the war there will rise the phoenix of a new man, a new European, and a new Pole. The Germans have already contributed in a great degree to the social equalization of the Polish society. Now there is only one class in the country—independent of former wealth and position—that of paupers without means or income. The people certainly feel entirely equal in misery, and it is a cruel irony, if not a conscious insult, to speak today of Polish "landlords" and "aristocrats." This material equalization, as well as common suffering and struggle, may promote a moral one; that is, a drawing together of Poles of various classes and of these and the national minorities. Thus a foundation will be laid for a deeper internal evolution toward a new psychic type and a new culture uniting permanent values of the past with fresh powers emanating from the working classes of the people. A larger democratization of Polish culture can, therefore, be expected than it has been possible, for historical reasons, to attain so far.

This evolution will be, of course, closely connected with and dependent upon a reformed educational policy. In regard to this, the new Poland will be able to continue the work inaugurated before the war by the mighty and truly progressive Polish Teacher's Association and partly materialized in the educational reform of 1932-1933. Its general idea was the *école active* and *école unique* system. This program could not be, at that time, fully realized for a number of reasons. But now, under German occupation, the same Teacher's

Association, working underground, has prepared a detailed plan of educational reconstruction going farther in elaboration of the former idea. Briefly, it establishes (1) a compulsory elementary-school system for all children between the ages of 6 and 14; (2) an equally compulsory system of secondary schools from ages 14 to 18 divided into sections of science, humanities, pedagogy, technic, and farm education; (3) college and university training for those who graduate from the secondary schools; (4) scientific institutions for special research. The far-reaching program urges the establishment of peoples' universities for the peasantry, a wide system of scholarship, a high standard in teacher-training institutions, possibilities for study in foreign countries, the independence of teachers from the political administration, freedom in their schoolwork and in selecting their own methods, and so on. Moreover, "the national educational task should be the responsibility of the ministry of education and culture" as "the supreme educational and cultural authority." "A national board of education and culture should be attached to the ministry in the capacity of a permanent advisory body with the right of initiative. The board should be composed of outstanding representatives of workers in the field of science and art, of teachers' unions, of cultural and educational organizations, of the local government and of professional bodies."⁴

Generally the program is permeated by a high social and democratic spirit in uniting the educational system with social life and social reforms. Professor Reinhold Schairer, an authority on educational problems, states in his Annotations to this publication that it is a truly Polish plan, a continuation of the Polish educational renaissance, started at the end of the eighteenth century by the National Education Commission "which has raised the standard of tolerance, liberalism, and effectiveness to which most other democratic nations have to look up even today." Moreover Dr. Schairer considers the

⁴ For details, see *The Proposed Educational Reconstruction in People's Poland* (New York: The Payne Educational Sociology Foundation, Inc., 1944).

Polish plan a realistic one, containing a list of urgent problems of a postwar education and indication of the new era in education.

One must realize, however, that the carrying out of these plans will take a long time in view of the conditions under which the Polish children and youth lived for long years. Only a part of them had the benefit of studying in underground schools, and even there the study could not be normal. A considerable part of them also participated in the underground work, thus preserving their moral health. But the rest were exposed to the unfavorable influence of a life of permanent fear and insecurity, of finding out means to deceive the Germans, and to acquire food. That is indeed not an atmosphere in which normal youth grows up.

But the main obstacle and danger lies elsewhere. For the realization of all these beautiful plans and programs for Poland's polity and policy, her cultural and educational work depends first of all upon whether the Polish state will enjoy a real liberty and independence. If it becomes a Russian "protectorate" and is governed by Soviet officials bearing Polish names, the whole vision of a new Poland will be ruthlessly destroyed. The decisions of the new Alliance at the Crimean Conference point rather to the latter possibility. It would mean the abandonment by the Western democracies of all truly democratic forces in Poland—one of the numerous paradoxes of this war—and the strengthening of nationalistic and reactionary elements which exist in Poland, as well as in all other countries. The latter would have an easier task in exciting the bitterness and disappointment of the Polish people and in demonstrating to them that any collaboration with the so-called democracies—even backed up by efficient military help and millions of victims, as in the Polish case—is fruitless and leads to national defeat.

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A CRUCIAL COUNTRY—HUNGARY

Emil Lengyel

Hungary occupies the very center of the broad belt of nationalities that extends from the Baltic to the Adriatic. While that belt is inhabited by a medley of Slavs, Germans, and Latins, the Hungarians are Finnish-Ugrians, related to the Finns and several tribes in Russia—hence they are an alien body.

Just because Hungary is a wedge in an uncongenial world, her people grew certain pressure-resisting traits, which have become almost a nationalistic obsession. While it is natural that human groups should regard themselves superior to all other groups, it is not quite usual that a small nation like Hungary should sing: "If the earth is the hat of God, Hungary is the bouquet on the hat."

The Hungarian came from the East, settled on the outskirts of Central Europe, and promptly established contact with the West. This he did because the craggy Carpathian range limited his horizon in the East, while the broad stream of the Danube opened the West to him. A thousand years ago he received his religion from Rome and some centuries later he received a challenge from the Geneva of Calvin. The Counter Reformation—also from the West—contested the Protestant influence. But even today the great plains city of Debrecen is known as the "Calvinist Rome." About one third of the Hungarians are Protestants, while the Catholics form some 60 per cent of the population.

In modern times the influence of the West was expressed in several ways. The focal points of that influence were Vienna and Paris. In recent times Vienna was the moon which reflected the rays of the German sun. After the Reich became united, Austria-Hungary fell under its sway and Hungary followed suit.

The influence of Germany was felt in the most important fields. The German military influence reached Hungary via Austria. It was the influence of a strictly disciplined army in which obedience ous-

ted the inclination to think. The army was a machine and the people in it tiny cogs. The very language of the Hungarian army—with the exception of the Honvéds—was German. The strident tone of the Prussianized sergeant was echoed by the barracks walls.

The Hungarian system of education was also a replica of the German one. Was the world not convinced at one time that the Prussian schoolmaster was responsible for the habitual victories of the German armed forces against Austria and the French?

In the social field, that school cultivated unquestioning obedience to authority. In order not to be entrapped by temptation, attention was fastened on the past, while the present was all but ignored. The school was the ideological projection of the barracks. In all fields, memory was strengthened, often at the expense of original thinking.

The other focal point of Western influence was Paris. It was far less formal and not exercised by authority. Being Easterners by origin, and settling in Middle Europe, the Hungarian intellectuals fell under the charm of the West. Many of them were hypnotized by it. Modern Hungary's greatest poet, Andreas Ady, considered the banks of the Seine his spiritual home. Never was he to forget the magnetic power of "la ville lumière" in his Transylvanian hills.

An entire Hungarian school of playwrights was drawn into the magic circle of Gallic wit. The most famous of them, Ferenc Molnár, not merely transplanted it to the banks of the Danube but also deepened it.

The bold thinkers of the new age turned toward the West and gave expression to their cravings in numerous ways. The most representative of the pioneering magazines assumed the title *West* (*Nyugat*), and the most searchingly critical social-science periodical called itself *Twentieth Century* (*Huszadik Század*). The iconoclastic university young people formed "The Galilei Society" (G. Kör).

The various forms of art were influenced by the West. The best

"Viennese" music was composed by the Hungarian, Franz Lehár. The Hungarian folk song sloughed off the mournful air of the Oriental song and was infused with the gay rhythm of the West. Hungarian architecture ignored the Byzantine influence of the East and sought to copy the monumental Gothic, as in the Hungarian parliament.

The Hungarian *Tonangeber* (keynoter), the blue-blooded aristocracy, aped the fox-hunting ways of old-fashioned English nobility. It would not have occurred to it to have a good time in the gay capital of adjacent Rumania or to take part in the fantastic winter carnivals of Russia's St. Petersburg. It was at home in the Scottish Highlands and in the Covent Garden of London.

For many centuries, Hungary's political orientation changed little. She was a satellite of the strongest near-by Western power, Austria, and later Hitler's Germany. She had to be such a satellite because Hungary was ruled by a small clique battenning on the backs of the miserable rate-payers, "misera plebs contribuens."

There were few other countries in which so few ruled over so many and in which so many had so little. Although feudalism was nominally abolished in 1848, informally it continued until our own days. In the very shadow of magnificent Budapest, as modern as the latest Parisian fad in style, there was feudal rural Hungary. On large entailed estates of the church and nabobs there lived millions of *nincstelenek* (people with nothing), bags of mere bones, scraping and bowing serfs. The few who had the right of vote were herded into polling booths where they "elected" their magnates' choices in open voting.

There were numerous excellent men in the Hungarian governments, it is true. They were the *Europaeer*—Europeans—who not merely aped but also wanted to imitate the West. The great revolutionary Lajos Kossuth once represented the spirit of a new age to the world. "The wise man of the fatherland," Ferenc Deák, also had an image of an enlightened age which he was bent on realizing

through a policy of compromises. The author and educator, Joseph Eotvös, was an inspired disciple of the West. Even among the run-of-the-mill politicians there were men of vision, such as Sándor Wekerle, who piloted through the law of civil marriage contract. But even these men of stature could do little to alter the feudal rule.

Democracy came to Hungary after the end of the First World War but it tarried little. Again the country relapsed into its autocratic ways. It is worthy of notice that even Germany was able to bear a timid experiment in democracy for a longer period.

The postwar era is associated with the name of Admiral Nicholas Horthy, who remained at the helm throughout these years. Hungary now turned away from the present even more than before. Just because in the past she had been ruled by kings, she called herself a kingdom—but had no king. The country was cut down to a mere skeleton, as her neighbors profited territorially at her expense. Yet the Hungarian school ignored the new map and outlined old Hungary's borders. The land held by the neighbors was "temporarily occupied."

The archaic land conditions, created under the feudal rule of the past, were changed all around Hungary. The large latifundia were broken up, and the little peasants received parcels of land. Hungary paid no more than lip service to land reform. It served again the magnates to get rid of their poorest land which the peasant was generously permitted to buy. The old stamp of feudalism still fitted postwar Hungary.

Then came the tornado in the form of the sweep of the Red Army across the land. The nazis elected to turn Budapest into another Stalingrad. In the wake of Hungary's defeat, a new government was set up under Soviet sponsorship. It requires no particular gift of prognostication to be able to foretell that the old feudal world went to its doom with the *dies irae*.

The feudal regime will, no doubt, make an attempt to come back. It cannot help making such an attempt. But no matter what happens

to that part of the world, it will not be able to re-assert itself. Such a system belongs to another planet in our days.

What will be Hungary's cultural orientation? It is bound to change basically. New Hungary must turn away from the pretenders of world rule in the West. If the magnates are out—and out they will be—they will no longer have to make common cause with Western despots in order to maintain themselves on the backs of the helpless masses.

The mission of new Hungary is in the East. She is more highly industrialized than her Balkan neighbors to the east and south. She can play a constructive role of leadership among them, instead of chasing the will-o'-the-wisp. The Hungarian has certain traits that fit him for his new role.

He is handy with tools and, unless the incentive is lacking, is industrious. He has a good mind and does not lack self-confidence. The Hungarian learns quickly. Exchange professors and students from the Allied countries could make a deep impression on the younger generation. They will be invested with the aura of the success of their cause and, of course, success is highly valued in the Danube valley, too.

Hungary has always been a far more important country than her size would indicate. At a strategic junction of continental highways, she formed a *place d'armes* which Western victors employed to deploy their forces in the East. This is what the Hapsburgs did in their attempt to set foot on the Balkans. This is what Hitler did in his attempt to secure the rule of the world. It was one of his first steps to obtain a foothold in Hungary. That done, he could penetrate into the Balkans. Once there, he could launch his attack upon the Soviets. Had it been successful, the world would no longer be free.

If Hungary is sealed up against such attacks of would-be world rulers, she can be turned into a useful member of European society. Magyarland must cease to be a cultural throwback into the dim past. Hungary has a Janus-face; she is a land of contrasts. While predomi-

nantly reactionary in the past, she had some liberal potentialities. The Allied powers must see to it that those tendencies are given a chance to grow and thrive. Having this key position safely in their hands, they will man that part of the ramparts of Europe which in the past served as the war-makers' point of attack. At this point they may be able to hold the Reich of the future at arm's length. It is to be hoped that the Allied leaders will be aware of Hungary's historical importance.

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BASQUE THOUGHT AT THE PRESENT MOMENT

José Antonio de Aguirre

Although the Basques are known to be one of the oldest peoples in existence, possessing an original language and a deep sense of independence, their juridical and social institutions are, on the other hand, completely unknown to many. Yet these institutions have represented the philosophical thought of the Basques in all periods of their history, the most interesting fact being that they have survived almost to our day because Basque thought has never changed.

When General Franco rebelled against the democratic institutions of Spain, he attacked with singular violence the peoples constituted in autonomy within the Republic; that is, the Basques and the Catalans. The resolute attitude of the Basques in their hostility toward the Spanish dictator (the Basques being one of the most religious countries in the world) attracted much attention in view of General Franco's stand as "defender of Christian civilization."

Something similar, in a political sense, occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century when the Liberals of the period came across the Basque case, unknown or forgotten till then. These intellectuals

found the Basque philosophy and authentic democratic regime very attractive. Surrounded by absolutist states, the Basques maintained in effect not only a progressive charter of individual liberties but also a political regime based on singular social equality.

Finally, attention was drawn to the manner in which the Basques combined their love for liberty with the religious tendency of their people. Jean Jacques Rousseau was so strongly attracted by this Basque peculiarity that he cherished the thought of living in the Basque country, as is shown in his *Confessions* when, referring to his friend the Basque Ignacio Manuel Altuna, he says, "I must, after a few years, go to Azcoitia to live with him in his country." Rousseau praises the tenacious civic and religious convictions of his friend, stating as an interesting contrast, "Aside from myself, I have never seen anyone so tolerant in my life." The Basque way soon became the fashion and, as is usual with fashions, soon was exaggerated. "The oldest known democracy" was praised to such an extent that inventions and fabulous exploits became a temptation of writers. There are authors of that period who, lost in the mystery of the origin of the Basque civilization which they wanted to explain somehow, stated nothing less than that the Basque language, Euzkera, was spoken in the Garden of Eden and was one of the few languages that survived the confusion of Babel.

Without having to recur to fables, there is one fact of permanent value that can satisfy the curiosity of those who today as well as in Rousseau's time, wish to understand the position of the Basques. This fact is that in the Basque country tradition is based as much on liberty in its individual human aspect as on its application to public institutions. This tradition has always been preserved even after the unity of the Basques was broken in the thirteenth century and the Basques were divided into various states, all of them sovereign.

On the 30th of July 1476, Ferdinand the Catholic appeared before the Parliament of Gernika and, in the presence of the people's representatives, gave his oath to respect the Basque liberties. And on this

occasion they told him "that according to the laws of custom and usage which had been the law of their land *as far back as the memory of man could reach* they asked him to take the oath to respect their Constitution." In 1706 the Cortes of Pamplona said to King Philip V of Spain, "The people had laws before they had Kings." With this they recalled that warning directed to the Kings of the Basque dynasty which was consecrated for their successors, the Kings of France or Spain, appearing in Chapter I, Section I, of the Fuero or Constitution of Navarre: "We, who each one of us are your equal, and all together are greater than you, proclaim you King so that you may guard our laws and see that they are carried out." This language could not be well received by absolutist sovereigns such as Philip V of Spain, but, because of the system of *equae principal* union under which the Basques lived until 1839, the King was absolute monarch in Spain, but for the Basques he was a constitutional monarch. This political freedom permitted the Basques to develop their own national character based on an unchanging philosophy.

The Basque laws began by consecrating the fundamental rights of man. The Biscayans incorporated them into their Constitution in Law XXVI, Section XI, in 1526, thus giving written form to a time-honored tradition. The law prohibited all authorities of any kind "to arrest any person without a writ from a competent judge except in the case of *flagrante delicto*. If a person has already been thus apprehended and a competent judge orders his freedom, he must immediately be set at liberty no matter what the cause or debt for which he has been taken prisoner."

In Laws I and V, Section 7, the procedure to be followed is outlined. It states that no person may be persecuted or arrested for any crime whatsoever, no matter how grave, unless he has previously been handed a judicial notice and summons to appear for judgment within a period of thirty days beneath the Tree of Gernika, where moreover he is granted the privilege of choosing which public jail he prefers. This summons must be incorporated in an edict, to be

read publicly beneath the Tree of Gernika, every ten days, certifying that this requirement be carried out by a scrivener and also that an authentic copy of the edict be delivered to the person making the denunciation of the supposed criminal. If after this procedure has been carried out the accused still does not present himself, then and only then is he declared to be in rebellion, and as the perpetrator of a criminal act may be detained or arrested by any citizen.

Completing these injunctions, Law II forbids the "torture or threat of torture, either direct or indirect, of any Biscayan whether he be in Biscay or any other part of the world." The last words indicate by their very excess how horrible the Basque conscience considered these inhuman measures which were accepted by the majority of the civilized societies of that time.

We could continue to quote protective laws of a humane nature but we have selected only those which have some originality. We will quote, nevertheless, some of the precepts which prohibited under penalty the use of spiritual means in temporal matters, distinguishing the independence of civil from ecclesiastic affairs. "Bishops and Prelates (Law II, Section 32) are forbidden to interfere in disputes among Biscayan laymen which come under the jurisdiction of His Highness the Lord, even though the dispute be between a Prelate and a layman or between ecclesiastical members." This is a precept of the Constitutional Reform of 1526, a period of the Inquisition and of Absolutism in many countries of Europe, and especially in Spain, whose monarch was also that of the Basques, as we indicated previously.

The family and the house are the base of the Basque political structure. The law pays special attention to them. "For no crime or any other cause may the Biscayan be dragged from his home." The law has made the home inviolable. Basque legislation extended such powerful and effective protection to the family and the home, not only because it represented a spiritual tradition but also because it had an important political role to play. "One family (house), one

vote" was the traditional Basque way of expressing their democracy. The men and women that represented their homes met freely and voted as equals in the election of their municipal representatives, and these in turn elected the representatives who made up the Basque Parliaments, the supreme authority in the Basque country. It is like a tree with roots, a trunk, and branches, an organic whole, which with the life sap of the race produces the fruit of their laws.

The Parliaments of Biscay, Gipuzkoa, Alaba, and Laburdi had only one kind of representative, that of the people, while the ecclesiastics were specifically forbidden to be elected as Deputies. Perhaps this is the only case of its kind in the Europe of that time, accustomed to forming its Parliaments or Cortes with representatives of the nobility, the clergy, and the populace.

With regard to democratic policy, the laws established a social democracy of equality of all its citizens, specifically prohibiting the use of titles of nobility, and with an economic system which, in the agricultural field especially, prevented the control by any one person or group of large territorial expanses. After having studied these laws, the Earl of Carnarvon wrote in 1836, "In short, the more carefully we examine the old Biscayan records, the more we shall be inclined to feel that the Basques have had no superiors in the race of civil and religious liberty." The Basques have been educated in this doctrine of respect of human dignity and of the real exercise of their democratic and social rights until 1839 when the Spanish monarchy, breaking the historic pact of Confederation, suppressed Basque sovereignty. But this action caused a vigorous reaction true to the secular tradition of liberty. After the Basque autonomy was partially restored in 1936 by the new Spanish Republican regime, the Basque country fell, in 1937, under the oppression of the dictatorial state of General Franco. There can be no greater contradiction than that between the Spanish totalitarian system and the desires of the Basque people. Therefore, they opposed the former with all their strength.

In dealing with the philosophical and political concepts of the Basques, we have preferred to recall the past. To call oneself liberal or democrat today is not difficult. More important is the feeling of the continuation of an uninterrupted tradition of humaneness and of practice of democracy. The future State of the Basques, once the Francoist oppression is ended, will be based on tradition since its basis need not be changed. In terms fitting the everyday circumstances, it will guarantee the rights of man, defend the family and its heritage based on minimum stable and nonconfiscatable property, encourage a sense of responsibility in economic matters and participation in the social benefits of all its workers, continue to proclaim democracy as the most perfect form of government, respect the religious belief of its people which will develop freely within the old standards of tolerance separated from civil matters, and finally try to coordinate its national liberty with that of the other countries, especially those existing in the Iberian Peninsula, in a federative organization which the Basques believe would be a stable solution.

These principles are stated in the present Basque laws. Some were applied by the Basque Government during its brief autonomous administration in 1936-1937 and others, which could not be applied because of the Spanish Civil War, await the restoration of liberty to be put into effect. Churchill said that only the peoples with a very sound tradition are destined to survive the great struggle humanity is undergoing. We believe that the Basque people are destined to be among them.

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SOME STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO GERMAN POLITICAL RE-EDUCATION

Friedrich W. Foerster

Military conditions of Germany's re-education. It is not astonishing that in dealing with the German postwar problem long-term occupation and re-education are always proposed together. Occupation is limited to a mere external control and compulsion, and nobody knows whether allied public opinion will support a prolonged staging of foreign military forces in Germany. Therefore, general attention is concentrated on the problem of how to complement the military method by the educational effort and how to adapt this effort to the mentality in question. In dealing with this difficulty we have first to realize that the direct educational action is not always the most effective. The most efficient education is not operated by so-called education, but by a clash with unyielding realities. If there will be installed in Germany an inflexible allied authority giving to every German the feeling that he has no longer any chance to impose his will upon the rest of the world, then the Germans are intelligent enough to create a new political ideology, better adapted to their central position in Europe and more in conformity with the spirit of their millenary history than the Bismarck ideology. (The German philosopher Lagarde called Bismarckism "the mortal disease of the German people.") To find that ideology Germans need only to go back to those thousand years of the Middle Ages when German culture and Germany's influence on the world was at its highest. Germany's history has two great phases, the constructive and the disruptive stages. The latter began with the Thirty Years' War and was a result of Germany's secession from the European spiritual community, and ended with the Prussianization of the German nation which was accomplished by conversion to Prussianism by the Austrian, Hitler. The constructive phase was the federa-

tive era inaugurated by the Pope who crowned Charlemagne and entrusted the German nation with the responsibility for the secular unity of Europe. At that time the German emperor was not a "pan-german" overlord, but the holder of an international office, the president of a league of nations, who had to coordinate the equal rights of federated nations. His authority was rather spiritual than juridical; he was the political expression of the Christian idea of justice and brotherhood which were recognized by the nations and considered as superior to mere nationality. This constructive role, which made Germany the bridge between the East and West, the North and the South, enlarged the German soul and gave to it a lasting impulse toward supranational universality, an impulse which even survived the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire, and inspired almost all the great political authors of the nineteenth century. They opposed in vain the national fury which possessed the German people and which was well exploited by the Prussian power in its efforts to use the German people for Prussian war aims.

In this sense every return to that great and essential German tradition would have at its disposal a very rich historical and philosophical literature. Such a reform would be a return of the German people to themselves and to the very spirit of their history. It would have to bring about a total revision of the interpretation of German history, this history having been misinterpreted and falsified by the literary mercenaries of Prussianism. Without a whole army of servile peons Prussianism would not have estranged the German people from their inherited cosmopolitan and federalistic tradition. All this has to be rectified, cleaned up, and re-interpreted. The de-Prussianization of Germany must be the true aim of Germany's political re-education. This is only possible by the most radical decentralization of the country, including its economic decentralization.

Of course this kind of political re-education appeals above all to the adult generations. German political rebirth must begin with

the older generation. The young generation is so terribly fanatized and shut off from foreign influence that one can only indirectly and gradually shake their beliefs in the Fuhrer's madness. In order to prepare the Germans for a new cultural exchange between and with the rest of the world and to discourage their megalomania and their belief in German self-sufficiency, the teachers of history have to dwell on the question: What does Germany owe to the Orient, to Rome, to the old Mediterranean civilization, to France, and to the Anglo-Saxon world?

The two essential tasks of political education. This question leads to the recognition of the two essential but very different tasks of education. One says with Pindar, the Greek poet: "Become yourself." This means living from our own roots, putting into full value our inherited gifts and capacities, studying our traditions, and honoring our past. The second task demands: Surpass yourself. Seek contact with that which is strange and opposite to yourself, enlarge yourself by throwing yourself into the world of others and by trying to understand their traditions, virtues, and achievements. Renan said: "When once France and Germany will have reconciled their differences, the two halves of the human soul will have found each other." This is very true. The Germans have the duty of men without the right of men; the modern French have the right of men without the duty of men. This is a parabel. We all live today with only half of our soul, as if we breathed with only half of our lungs. But no people can solve its own problems without the complementary gifts and virtues of others. This is especially true for Germany which is a particularly emotional country and therefore falls victim to the worst kind of guidance. It is an absolutely dangerous error to say that you cannot implant in Germany some indispensable democratic ideals. They must learn political responsibility or they will die out. They will begin to learn it by the grave consequences of their indifference, their credulity, their blank check grant to a gang of ruthless bandits. The anti-Western and antidemocratic agitation

beginning in Germany under the guidance of Troeltsch and others, and boasting of a German culture, detached from elements of political responsibility is dangerous luxury. Thomas Mann preached that dangerous gospel in his book *Political Considerations of an Unpolitical*, but he retracted his error after having seen that culture without a political conscience leads to nothing but naked collective barbarism. It is true that Germany cannot be educated by American teachers, but it is also true that they need a baptism in Anglo-Saxon liberty and enlightened popular control, just as they needed humanistic education by Greek and Latin literature and by Judaic and Christian influences, which did more in developing the best kind of German genius than all recurrence to the gestures of Wotan and his swollen Walkyries. Nobody has stated that more clearly than Goethe.

Martin Luther and political ethics. The German contempt for political culture and responsibility is a fatuous inheritance from Luther. "Politics," he said, "is a secular affair." Surely as far as it has to do with secular details. But it is much more a spiritual affair because the state becomes a gang of robbers unless it recognizes its own spiritual foundations and implications. The present complete moral dissolution of the German state, this well-disciplined anarchy, is only the logical result of the manner in which in Germany the public affairs were cut off from the spiritual life of the nation. It is not typical that even a Christian like Niemoller, who so heroically defended his Christian patrimony, remained in politics very near to the nazis. The German theologian Althaus declared, "Politics is an expression of God's will in its own field and in contrast with the kingdom of God." This is typically German. A French writer called it "the treason of the spirituals." The spirituals abandoned politics to the devil and the Prussians. Then came the only logical second step: as patriots they joined the diabolical policy. It is as if Emerson would have joined the bandits in the Wild West and would have called this union "national solidarity."

Machiavellianism has not been invented in Germany, but influenced by Luther the Germans drew the most devastating consequences from a teaching which dispensed personal conscience of any control of the external world. This was reinforced by a growing materialism which believed that state affairs had to be entrusted to the underworld. Gladstone said "What is politically wrong can never be politically right." The Germans thought that "War that is morally right *must* be politically wrong." This is bound to end in bestiality. Very logically a German ex-theologian said in his book, "Post Christum, the German man has thrown off the illusions of 2,000 years and humbly accepted the law of the beast." And so they acted.

These statements show how great is the task of revising their political thought. We have to begin with shaking their belief in their whole so-called political biology which radically discarded the spiritual world—and its bloody vengeance wherever a blinded nation believed exclusively in the case of immediate and visible success. Therefore, the whole re-education of the German people has to begin with an interpretation of the actual gigantic judgment of the *Weltgericht* over Germany. "Never the Goddess forgets the murderer of nations," says the chorus in the "Oresty." But between this teaching and the German people stands the iron wall of millions of lies told during more than one hundred years. A whole literature about facts and responsibilities has to be created and distributed in order to disinfect them. Without such a penetrating cure no light will enter the German soul; no conversion and no new orientation will be possible.

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EDUCATIONAL FEDERATION IN SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Reinhold Schairer

The three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, will begin their postwar education with one great constructive force not existing among any other nations: an educational federation.

The educational federation among these three nations is indeed a unique feature. It has peacefully united these formerly aggressive and war-minded nations into a family of nations, yet it has avoided any form of compulsion or uniformity. It is no exaggeration to state that war between these nations from now on is impossible. Yet this Scandinavian federation is not based on any diplomatic acts or international treaties. Educational federation takes the place of peace treaties.

Sometimes foreign observers assume that the Scandinavian countries form a national unity with one language and one national character. The opposite is true. The temperaments and traditions of these three nations are very different. Their three languages have their different characteristics and entirely different literature. It is not uncommon to find Danes and Swedes making their conversation in English. The new Norwegian language, the "Landsmaal," has been created as a permanent protest against the Danish, imposed during the foreign domination of Norway by Denmark.

In 1905 Norway revolted against the union with Sweden and demanded complete independence. For months the armies were standing on both sides of the frontiers, waiting until the first shot would open a murderous war. Still today the citizens of both countries tell stories about how the teachers, students, and church people prevented this war by permanent negotiations. The educational federation won a splendid peace victory, better than diplomats ever did,

because this peace victory left no bitterness and resentment. The educational federation did even more; it created what we today fondly call "Scandinavia." If Europe could open in the eyes and minds of the world a similar federation and unity, the main peace problems of the world would be settled.

Scandinavia, or as the Scandinavians call it, "Norden," has been born entirely as an educational or even poetic concept. Said Gruntvig, one of the fathers of Scandinavia one hundred years ago, "The countries in the North have one mission, to be the younger sister of Athlone." What he intended to give to the Nordic people was a great and inspiring vision, a picture, to whose formation and realization every one could contribute, leaving a large section of its realization to his children and grandchildren. Once he stated, "Nothing great happens in the life of a nation, which is not announced before by poetry." Poetry and education are the forces that form the fate of nations; this was the origin of the Scandinavian educational federation.

In the same decades, south of Scandinavia, the German states formed a different pattern. This pattern, too, had its poetry: "Germany, Germany over all other nations." Or "The God who created iron, did not intend to create slaves, therefore he gave the sword in the hand of man." In songs, textbooks, sermons, and lectures resounded the barbarian concept of blood and iron, of the German warrior as superman, of the coming victory of the Germans, and their mission to rule the world. And a different pattern of federation was formed. The "Iron Chancellor," Bismarck, attacked and conquered and subjugated other nations including South Germany, and from Berlin the domination of education in all German states advanced more and more, until Hitler, at last, had the courage to do what so many Prussians had always dreamed of: to annihilate every form of educational independence in any German state and to make education of the eighty million Germans a matter strictly controlled, directed, and manipulated by Berlin.

The world paid a high price for the error to have tolerated, even applauded, this Bismarckian and Hitlerian pattern so fundamentally different from the Grundtvigian and Bjoernsonian and Soederblomian patterns, to mention only three names of many prophets of Scandinavia: a Danish educator, a Norwegian poet, and a Swedish church leader. How was the educational pattern of Scandinavia implemented in the educational structure? Not by governments, but by the educators and the students themselves.

Moved by the concept of Scandinavia, the Danish teachers proposed in 1863 regular conferences of the teachers of the Scandinavian countries. It took seven years before this first conference was held in 1870. These Nordic conferences have since become one of the real important and efficient instruments of educational federalism. These conferences are entirely different from any other international conferences. Several thousand teachers and students take part. The conferences are carefully prepared, and the discussion and resolutions are masterpieces of democratic procedure. The communications and publications following the conferences influence the schools in the farthest corner of those countries. The Nordic educational conferences have no weight except their moral influence, yet they have produced among many other results the only real effective system to take out of the textbooks errors, prejudices, and lies that poison youth in international relations, and the antiquated history teaching. They have produced mutual respect and friendship. They have advanced the modern achievement of education, as, for instance, equal chances in education for the children of all classes, advancement of manual training in all the schools, intensification of international studies, promotion of an enlightened attitude on social questions, and, last but not least, the recognition that no educational system is perfect if it does not offer a great variety of institutions of adult, labor, and farmer education.

But the conferences are only a beginning. They opened a large program of exchanges of pupils, students, teachers, and professors,

inter-Scandinavian vacation camps, and travel facilities connected with the schools and universities, special vacation courses for friends from the other Scandinavian countries, all of which have developed to a degree unknown among any other group of nations.

A permanent institution, the Committee *Norden* (the north), has been formed as a well-established agency of co-administration. Its task is to prepare and organize training courses for teachers in inter-Scandinavian affairs, to develop students and teachers for their responsibility for the large-scale and extremely useful inter-Scandinavian projects. Common magazines are published, such as *The Scandinavian Scientific Review*, founded in 1922 in Oslo.

The essential thing in all these efforts is that they are based entirely on the free and voluntary efforts of the teachers, pupils, and schools themselves. They are not imposed, or granted, or financed by any government agency. By this truly democratic effort of the schools themselves, this form of inter-Scandinavian cooperation and friendship has developed, has become a natural function of the schools themselves, enters therefore naturally in all subjects and activities, and forms effectively lifelong habits of the younger generation. In this way, the movement is not limited to the school. The workers and farmers, the poets and writers, industrialists and professionals, and last but not least the common people are more and more transformed into an attitude of inter-Scandinavian friendship and cooperation, which makes tensions and frictions obsolete and antiquated and international laws and treaties superfluous.

The inter-Scandinavian educational federation is a genuine picture of which Plato may have dreamed: the educator replaces the legislator. Statesmen and educators, shaping the future of a peaceful world, should carefully study and apply to other countries this unique case of federation by education, of which this report gives a general description only.

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EDUCATION AND THE NEW OUTLOOK

H. C. Dent

Just over a year ago I published a book, *Education in Transition*, in which I attempted to survey wartime developments in Britain's education. The following comment upon this book appeared recently in the *American Journal of Sociology*:

In common with other Americans, this reviewer has been puzzled by stories from England that the war was paving the way for a social revolution in which the disadvantages and the inequalities suffered by the poor would be removed. Since there is no evidence that such a revolution is under way in the United States, we have thought that perhaps some well-meaning Englishmen were deluding themselves. But this book reveals the substance behind the stories and makes one believe that basic educational changes are more likely to come to England after the war than in America.

I quote the above only to endorse the fundamental point the reviewer makes. A social revolution *is* under way in Britain, and the basic educational changes now being made (in Scotland and North Ireland as well as in England and Wales) are understandable only in the light of this fact. They offer concrete evidence of its reality; they are among the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual transformation which is undoubtedly taking place.

There is plenty of other evidence; for example, the earnest attention being paid to the problems of full employment, social security, public health, housing, and, not least, the welfare of the peoples in the British colonies. All these are closely allied expressions of the revolutionary spirit, and not one of them can be genuinely assessed in isolation from the rest.

It is no more possible to say when this revolution began than when it will be completed. Looking back, one fancies that its first faint stirrings can be discerned at least a century ago. It may be (though I hope not) that another century will have to elapse before it is per-

fect. What can be said with certainty is that the experiences of the present war have immensely speeded up its development; so much so as to bring it to a point of grand climax.

This is clear beyond doubt in the field of education. Last year Britain's Parliament passed the Education Act, 1944—a revolutionary Act if ever there was one. This Act completely recasts the structure of the public system of education for England and Wales,¹ transforming it from an aggregation of separate and imperfectly coordinated systems into a single coherent and comprehensive system, flexibly organized in progressive stages, and intended to be adequate to meet the needs of all. It steps up the compulsory foundation from the elementary to the secondary level. It bridges the gap between the education of the young and the education of the adult. It recognizes that at all stages education must cover the whole life. And for the first time in Britain's history, it lays a statutory obligation upon the public authorities to secure that everywhere the quantity, variety, and quality of education at which it aims shall in fact be provided.

Yet in the realm of ideas this Act reflects nothing absolutely new. Educationists have clamored for years for every one of the reforms it embodies. What is important, and highly significant, is that at one blow all these reforms have been removed from the realm of aspiration to that of actuality. A transfer on such a scale has never happened before in Britain; and it has only happened now because the hard experiences of this war have driven home to Britain's people that education matters, that the nation cannot hope to survive in the future unless its men and women—all of them—are educated to the limit of their capacity and according to their infinitely varied aptitudes.

The war has revealed with a clarity that cannot be ignored both

¹ The Education Act, 1944, applies only to England and Wales. Acts of Parliament to be passed for Scotland and Northern Ireland this year will bring about fundamentally the same situation in these countries.

the inadequacy of the previous provision of public education and the terrible inequality of opportunity there was to partake of it beyond the lowest—the elementary—school level. So the keynotes of the new Act are adequacy of provision and equality of opportunity. This is best summarily illustrated by the charge laid upon the local education authorities (in section 7 of the Act) that they shall

... so far as their powers extend ... contribute towards the spiritual, moral, mental and physical development of the community by securing that efficient education ... shall be available to meet the needs of the population of their area.

No more solemn or all-embracing charge has ever been laid upon the public authorities of Britain, or so far as I know of any other country. The fact that it was agreed to with acclamation by Parliament (which, whatever defects it may possess, does reflect with a high degree of accuracy the state of public opinion in Britain) is an index of the advance toward the democratic ideal which Britain's public opinion has made during the war. Comparable indices are the rapturous reception of the Beveridge reports on social security and full employment, the universal approval of the idea of a national health service (the disagreement about this is solely regarding its form), and the widespread concern about town and country planning, public-housing policy, slum clearance, sanitation, and so on.

To refer to these other aspects of social reform is not to digress. On the contrary, I shall fail completely of my purpose in this article if I do not make it crystal clear that the great educational reforms upon which Britain is embarking are in no sense whatever to be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. They are an integral part of an all-inclusive social revolution which has long been slowly gathering strength and momentum and which has suddenly been brought to a head by nearly six years of total war that has laid bare in all its nakedness the fundamental ideological conflict between the concepts of democracy and totalitarianism.

The peoples² of Britain have come down solidly on the side of democracy. This was only to be expected; indeed, it is almost inconceivable that such individualistic peoples could have come to any other decision. But they have also set themselves consciously to the task of translating the democratic ideal into living reality in every aspect of the national life. Hitherto, we in Britain have taken our democracy too much for granted. The war has shown us that it is seriously defective. We mean to put that right.

Of course, it is not going to be easy. Nor quick. In an old civilization traditions, conventions, customs, habits, and prejudices exercise the most powerful influences upon thought. You cannot expect anything like the speed of change which you would regard as normal in the United States, though when I recall the distance we have traveled in education in England during the past five and one half years I am tempted to think we might even catch up on you in this respect ere long!

To illustrate: in 1936, after prolonged and acrimonious debate, Parliament passed Education Acts for England and Wales, and Scotland, which raised the age of compulsory attendance at school to 15, but permitted exemption after 14 to all who could prove an offer of "beneficial employment." The Education Act, 1944, provides for successive raisings of the age to 15 and 16, with no question of exemption; and the only substantial anxiety in the public mind is lest the raising to 16 be too long delayed.³

The 1936 Acts make no pretense of extending genuine secondary education; the 1944 Act makes it compulsory for all children, and again the major public anxiety is that the new secondary schools shall be able to offer forms of secondary education equal in value and esteem with that offered by the established secondary schools.

The 1936 Act of England and Wales was delayed for five years (as

² It is important not to overlook the fact that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland comprises four countries inhabited by racially different peoples.

³ The raising to 15 must take place not later than April 1, 1947.

many previous reforms were delayed) by denominational controversies. The 1944 Act embodies—for the first time in Britain's history—an agreed compromise on the vexed questions of religious instruction and public grants-in-aid to schools on a denominational foundation. The compromise was accepted by Parliament and the public with the minimum of controversy; every one felt that no sectional interest could be allowed to delay general advance.

It has been a standing reproach to Britain's democracy that for a century or more there have been absolutely separate systems of education for the rich and the poor; the first expensive, well supplied, and well staffed, the second cheap, ill-supplied, and inadequately staffed. The new Act lays it down that the publicly maintained primary and secondary schools

... shall not be deemed to be sufficient unless they are sufficient in number, character and equipment to afford for all pupils opportunities for education offering such variety of instruction and training as may be desirable in view of their different ages, abilities and aptitudes. . . .

In other words, that the publicly maintained *free* primary and secondary schools (there are to be no tuition fees charged in maintained secondary schools after first April next) shall be fully adequate for their jobs, and so inferior to no others in the country.

In 1942 the President of the Board of Education (now the Minister of Education) set up an official committee to advise him on how to bring about a closer relationship between the exclusive "public schools" and the general educational system. No real solution has yet been found to this particularly thorny problem, but the committee did at least recommend a considerable measure of accessibility, on the score of ability alone, to the public schools.

One could go on for pages giving instances of the ways in which Britain's attitude to education has radically altered. Since 1918 it has been permissible for local education authorities to provide nursery schools or classes for children below the age of 5. Few were pro-

vided, for few authorities realized the need. The new Act makes provision compulsory wherever the need is proved and the public opinion not only accepts but warmly endorses the obligation.

Equal concern is felt about the out-of-date school buildings and the overlarge classes in the primary schools. Teachers have been protesting against these for many years, but little was achieved because public opinion was apathetic. Today public opinion is determined to put an end to these obstacles to progress.

Another significant change is in the attitude toward adult education of all kinds. The provision of facilities for technical education has been lamentably inferior; it is everywhere resolved that this shall be no longer so. The universities have come under fire as never before since the early days of the nineteenth century; the public wants more university places, curricula more relevant to the needs of modern society, and more up-to-date teaching techniques. In the realm of general or "cultural" adult education a revolution all by itself has been effected, largely through the schemes of adult education promoted by the combatant services. Before the war adult education of all kinds touched no more than 3 per cent of the adult population; a few weeks ago the Ministry of Education issued a pamphlet urging the provision of community centers having an educational purpose in every sizable town and village, and were universally commended for so doing.

The above is indicative of our present state of mind in Britain. We have a long way to go, and we know it. We shall make mistakes, hesitate, fumble. But our faces are set toward full democracy, and we are determined to get there. As is only right and proper, education is leading the way.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Millhands and Preachers, by LISTON POPE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942, 369 pages.

In 1929 Gastonia, N.C., found herself front-page news throughout the nation. This sleepy cotton mill community had been invaded by the communists who had organized a strike and brought chaos to the entire community. They brought ideologies which were foreign to the inhabitants of the county. They challenged the whole capitalistic structure including its ideas of law and order, respect for private property, and above all its religion. The outcome is history and need not be repeated.

Mr. Pope has made a painstaking study of the role of ministers in this county in the development of industry, during the strike conflict, and in the post-strike adjustment. The study shows amazingly the integration of the institutional fabric of a community into a total way of life. It is an answer to the theory that any one institution of the community dominates the social process. The economic determinists will be no less disappointed than those who expect the church to "save the world."

The study is an excellent illustration of cultural contact, conflict, and cultural reintegration. There was only discontent, hard living conditions, and frustration before the advent of the communists. Their appeals to mass revolt offered a way out. The strike failed because of the injection of ideologies which were too diverse to those of the strikers. In the process of cultural reintegration the church played an important role by bringing in their best evangelists to call the people back to God—which is to say back to submission.

Those who think of religious sects as conflict groups which transform society will be disappointed to know that the "holiness" groups are doing the best job of keeping the people in submission. They center attention on the next world as a sedative for present hardships.

All in all the picture is not a pretty one. People interested in religion should read the book to understand why enlightened labor is deserting the church. Sociologists should read it for its insight into institutional forces. Others should read it to gain a better understanding of the social forces that determine our social life.

